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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, college campuses have served as forums for war protests,1 academic experimentation,2 and the free exchange of ideas.3 Although demonstrations like those in the 1960s do not seem to be the primary method of political protest among students anymore, college campuses are inherently politically charged places used for the expression of
many diverse opinions—nearly all American colleges host student political groups or issue-based groups that seek to bring awareness to a particular cause. When protests do happen, students sometimes get violent or
the situation becomes chaotic, resulting in sit-ins, class disruptions, severe tensions between students and administrators, and even student arrests.4 Despite these sometimes negative results, colleges and universities
are well-aware that learning depends on the free exchange of ideas.5 In
fact, the learning environment that colleges seek to maintain depends on
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the freedom to speak about controversial issues and the freedom to hear
differing opinions.6
For these reasons, colleges and universities are unique public spaces. They are devoted to creating an atmosphere conducive to learning,
thereby ensuring a quality education.7 Colleges create this atmosphere
through methods such as tenure,8 protecting freedom of speech and assembly on portions of their campuses,9 and establishing “gun-free zones”
so students feel safe to express themselves.10 Unlike public parks, for
example, colleges and universities have not traditionally been open to the
public, and they provide more than just opportunities for recreation. Rather, colleges have an interest in seeing their students well-educated,
enabling them to become functioning members of our society.11
A good education requires students and faculty to feel safe and
comfortable when expressing their ideas or making mistakes in the classroom. In order to provide this safe academic learning environment, the
vast majority of colleges prohibit carrying or possessing guns on their
campuses.12 The learning environment could be severely compromised if
students or faculty were potentially carrying a firearm because some individuals may feel threatened or intimidated, which could very well inhibit their ability to learn.13
The notion that universities should provide an environment where
students and faculty feel safe enough to freely exchange ideas has been
advocated for in the context of the First Amendment. For example, in
response to Yale University Press’s decision to remove images of Mohammed from a scholarly text, several academic and free-speech groups
6. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND TENURE WITH 1970 INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS 3 (2006), http://www.aaup.org/
NR/rdonlyres/EBB1B33033D34A51B534CEE0C7A90DAB/0/1940StatementofPrinciplesonAcade
micFreedomandTenure.pdf.
7. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957).
8. Walter Metzger, Academic Tenure in America: A Historical Essay, in COMMISSION ON
ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, 114–16 (1973).
9. See Derek P. Langhauser, Free and Regulated Speech on Campus: Using Forum Analysis
for Assessing Facility Use, Speech Zones, and Related Expressive Activity, 31 J.C. & U.L. 481, 481
(2005).
10. See, e.g., Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1269 (D. Utah 2003) (The university asserted that the purpose of its gun-free policy included the preservation of the educational
process.).
11. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331–32 (2003); see also Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is
most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation.”).
12. See Derek P. Langhauser, Gun Regulation of Campus: Understanding Heller and Preparing for Subsequent Litigation and Legislation, 36 J.C. & U.L. 63, 63 (2009).
13. Kathy L. Wyer, A Most Dangerous Experiment? University Autonomy, Academic Freedom,
and the Concealed-Weapons Controversy at the University of Utah, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 983, 1016
(2003).
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urged higher-education institutions to “stand up for certain basic principles: that the free exchange of ideas is essential to liberal democracy;
that each person is entitled to hold and express his or her own views
without fear of bodily harm . . . .”14 These principles should also be
upheld within the context of deciding how guns should be regulated on
college campuses.
Finally, implicit in the concept of the academic freedom doctrine is
the notion that colleges and universities require autonomy and should
have the power to dictate policy choices on their campuses.15 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that “the essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost selfevident . . . . To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation.”16 It
follows then that the academic freedom doctrine necessarily “restricts the
scope of permissible legislative interference with public [colleges and]
universities.”17
Traditionally, regulating firearms has been under the authority of
the states.18 But two recent judicial opinions have changed Second
Amendment jurisprudence and may affect how public colleges and universities regulate guns on their campuses. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court settled the debate as to whether the Second
Amendment was a collective right related solely to state militia service,
or whether it provided an individual right to keep and bear arms.19 Specifically, the Court held that individual self-defense is “the central component” of the Second Amendment,20 and law-abiding citizens must be
permitted “to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”21 In dicta, however, the majority stated that “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the
Second Amendment is not unlimited,”22 and it expressed support for tra14. Peter Schmidt, Colleges are Urged to Defend Free Speech, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.,
Nov. 30, 2009, http://chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Urged-to-Defend-Free/49297/. Yale University
Press refused to publish the illustrations because it feared publication would trigger violence. Id. In
response, academic and free-speech groups released a joint statement calling on colleges and universities to stand up for free expression. Id.
15. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329; see also Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 265–66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(reasoning that the First Amendment created a right of academic freedom).
16. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
17. Wyer, supra note 13, at 1013. Part of the concern about legislative interference stems from
the fact that a state may pass a statute that supersedes a college or university regulation. See discussion infra Part II.A.
18. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3125 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that
private gun regulation is the quintessential exercise of a state’s police power).
19. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 635.
22. Id. at 626.
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ditional exercises of police power, including, but not limited to, “the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings . . . .”23
Two years later, in McDonald v. Chicago, the Court incorporated
the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller against the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 The
Court reiterated its assurance that “longstanding regulatory measures”
such as the prohibition of firearms in sensitive places would not be imperiled by either its holding in Heller or its incorporation of the Second
Amendment.25 But several questions remain. Do prohibitions of guns on
college campuses infringe on a fundamental right? What standard of review should lower courts use when evaluating gun regulations? What
types of regulations can survive? What should colleges do to maintain
authority over their campuses? Because incorporation may imply that the
right is fundamental, McDonald poses a legitimate threat to a public college’s interest in prohibiting firearms on campus.
This Comment will argue that because McDonald’s holding limits
the right under the Second Amendment to protect individuals using guns
in defense of “hearth and home,” public colleges and universities are
constitutionally permitted to continue prohibiting guns on their campuses. And although the Court did not explicitly state the standard of review
that should apply when determining whether a regulation unconstitutionally infringes on the right to keep and bear arms,26 this Comment will
argue that prohibition of guns on campuses and even in residence halls
should survive strict scrutiny because the policy is narrowly tailored to
achieve compelling interests in academic freedom and public safety.
Part II summarizes Heller, McDonald, and incorporation against the
states, in general. Part III discusses recent lobbying efforts and explains
how the McDonald case implicates public colleges and universities. Lastly, in Part IV, I argue that intermediate scrutiny should be the standard of
review, but even if the courts use strict scrutiny, gun-free zones on public
college campuses should be held constitutional.
23. Id.
24. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
25. Id. at 3047.
26. In Heller, the Court did appear to foreclose rational basis as the appropriate standard of
review when it stated that banning from the home the most preferred firearm in the nation to use for
self-defense would fail constitutional muster under any of the standards of scrutiny applied to enumerated constitutional rights. 554 U.S. at 628–29. In a footnote, the Court briefly elaborated on its
standard of review discussion, stating, “If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and
bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.” Id. at 628 n.27. Accordingly, this
Comment does not address whether a gun-free zone would survive rational basis review.

2011]

The Second Amendment Goes to College

239

II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO
KEEP AND BEAR ARMS IN SELF-DEFENSE OF HEARTH AND HOME
In this Part, I will summarize the holding in Heller and highlight
some of the dicta that have left lower courts with more questions than
guidance on the Second Amendment. Then I will briefly discuss the incorporation doctrine, the majority opinion in McDonald, and their implication on state regulation of firearms.
A. District of Columbia v. Heller
In spite of the Supreme Court’s previous jurisprudence on the
Second Amendment,27 the majority in Heller found that the Second
Amendment was an individual right rather than a collective right dependent upon service in a well-regulated militia.28 The Court held that even
if the purpose of codifying the Second Amendment was to preserve the
state militia, individual self-defense was nevertheless the “central component” of the right.29 In Heller, the gun-control regulation at issue was
the essential prohibition of handguns within the District of Columbia.30
The District made it a crime to carry any unregistered firearm and refused to register any handguns thereby making them unlawful.31 The statute further required all lawfully registered firearms to be either unloaded
or bound by a trigger lock.32 The Court reasoned that the D.C. regulation
27. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (“In the absence of any evidence
tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in
length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such
an instrument.”); see also Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (repeating its holding from
United States v. Cruikshank—the Second Amendment is “one of the amendments that has no other
effect than to restrict the powers of the national government”); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542, 553 (1875) (“[Bearing arms for a lawful purpose] is not a right granted by the Constitution.
Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The Second Amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this . . . means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress.”).
28. Heller, 554 U.S. at 591–92.
29. Id. at 599. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to discuss whether the majority’s interpretation of the historical record was flawed. See id. at 639–40 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the holding in Miller—which declared that the Second Amendment protects only the right to keep
and bear arms for certain military purposes and does not diminish the power of Congress to regulate
the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons—is “both the most natural reading of the Amendment’s text and the interpretation most faithful to the history of its adoption”); see also Patrick J.
Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance: A True Legal and Historical Understanding
of the Anglo-American Right to Arms, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 18 (2010); Saul Cornell,
Originialism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625
(2008). Although numerous articles have been written on the debate, this Comment accepts the
majority opinion for what it now is—the law of the land.
30. Heller, 554 U.S. at 574.
31. Id. at 574–75.
32. Id. at 575.
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prohibited from the home “the most preferred firearm in the nation to
keep and use for protection” and therefore failed strict scrutiny.33 Accordingly, it held that a total ban on the possession of handguns in the home
unconstitutionally infringed on the right of a law-abiding individual to
keep and bear arms for self-defense.34
The Heller Court declined to specify the standard of review lower
courts should use when determining whether a gun regulation impermissibly infringes on an individual’s Second Amendment right. In dicta,
however, the majority stated that the right is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever
purpose.”35 Furthermore, the Court stated that “nothing in our opinion
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”36 The Court even went so far as to identify these
regulatory measures—now known as the Heller Safe Harbor—as examples of presumptively lawful regulations, the list of which is not exhaustive.37
Despite these reassurances, the majority opinion responded to Justice Breyer’s dissent in which he discusses the standard of review courts
should use when deciding whether a gun regulation meets constitutional
muster.38 Justice Breyer proposed a case-by-case interest-balancing approach that would differ from the traditionally expressed levels of strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.39 In response,
the majority stated, “We know of no other enumerated constitutional
right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”40 The Court then used the First Amendment as
an example to illustrate its point:
[T]he freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified . . . included exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure of
state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely unpopular and
33. Id. at 628–29.
34. Id. at 635.
35. Id. at 626.
36. Id. at 626–27.
37. Id. at 627 n.26.
38. Id. at 634.
39. Id. These traditional standards of review are also used to evaluate whether state laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. See Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect
Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 135–37 (2011).
40. Id. But see Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 376 (2010) (arguing that modern First Amendment doctrine leans
heavily toward balancing tests rather than the categorical approach adopted in Heller).
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wrong-headed views. The Second Amendment is no different. Like
the First, it is the very product of an interest-balancing by the
people—which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them anew.
And whatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates
above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.41

On one hand, this dictum might be helpful to those who wish to
analogize the Second Amendment to the First when arguing for a particular standard of review. On the other, it may suggest that the right to
keep and bear arms in self-defense of the home is absolute, meaning
there would be no compelling government interest that could ever outweigh it. If the right is absolute, public colleges and universities would
encounter significant difficulties in arguing the constitutionality of prohibiting the possession of guns in their residence halls.
B. Incorporation Doctrine
Because the Bill of Rights applies only to the federal government,42
much of the scholarship written after the Heller decision came down revolved around whether the Court would next incorporate the Second
Amendment against the states.43
The theory that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause incorporated the Bill of Rights in its entirety has never been embraced.44 In
United States v. Cruikshank, the Court held that the Second Amendment
“shall not be infringed; but this . . . means no more than that it shall not
be infringed by Congress.”45 Two subsequent cases, Presser v. Illinois
and Miller v. Texas, “reaffirmed that the Second Amendment applies
only to the Federal Government.”46 These three cases, however, were
decided before the Court began the process of “selective incorporation.”47 Through this process, the Court began to hold that particular
41. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
42. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 26 U.S. 243, 247 (1833) (“[T]he Constitution was ordained
and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not
for the government of the individual states.”).
43. See generally Ben Howell, Come and Take It: The Status of Texas Handgun Regulation
After District of Columbia v. Heller, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 215 (2009); Nelson Lund, Anticipating
Second Amendment Incorporation: The Role of Inferior Courts, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 185 (2008).
44. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3033 (2010); see, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78, 99–91 (1908) (holding that neither the Privileges and Immunities Clause nor the Due
Process Clause protects the right against self-incrimination from state action); Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not protect the grand jury indictment requirement).
45. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
46. Heller, 554 U.S. at 620.
47. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031.
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rights contained in the first eight amendments applied to the states under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.48 In order to determine whether a right should be incorporated against the states, the
Court has recognized that due process protects “rights that are the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty and essential to a fair and enlightened system of justice.”49 Accordingly, First Amendment rights such as
the freedom of religion,50 the freedom of assembly,51 and the freedom of
the press52 have all been incorporated against the states. The warrant requirement,53 the exclusionary rule,54 and the freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment55 have also been incorporated. When the Court finds that the Due Process Clause protects an
individual right, incorporation safeguards that right from impermissible
infringement by state action, including action undertaken by public colleges and universities.
C. McDonald v. Chicago
Until 2010, the Second Amendment was on the short list of rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights that were not incorporated against the
states. Heller held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep
and bear arms in the home for the purpose of self-defense, but it did not
address the issue of incorporation.
The majority in McDonald found that in order for the right recognized in Heller to apply against the states, the right must be “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition.”56 The Court cites its historical analysis from Hel48. Id. at 3034; see, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1936) (holding that freedom
of assembly falls under the protection of the Due Process Clause); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
53 (1932) (holding that assistance of counsel in capital cases is protected under the Due Process
Clause); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that freedom of speech and press
fall under the protection of the Due Process Clause).
49. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 148 (1968) (stating that the test for incorporation is “whether a right is among those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions”).
50. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment
Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise
Clause).
51. De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 364.
52. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666.
53. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964).
54. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
55. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949).
56. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010). There has been some debate as to
whether the McDonald opinion distorted the incorporation test. See id. at 3093 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “inclusion in the Bill of Rights is neither necessary nor sufficient for an interest to
be judicially enforceable under the Fourteenth Amendment”). Once again, however, it is beyond the
scope of this Comment to engage in whether McDonald was decided correctly. Instead, I focus on
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ler to show that the Second Amendment was deeply rooted in our country’s history and tradition. The English Bill of Rights protected keeping
arms for self-defense; during the ratification of the United States Bill of
Rights, there was a fear that the federal government would disarm the
people; and in the 1850s, when the perceived threat of militia disarmament faded, the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense was highly
valued.57 The Court further argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1866
“aimed to protect the constitutional right to bear arms and not simply to
prohibit discrimination.”58 Based on this analysis, the Court found that
“the right to bear arms was regarded as a substantive guarantee, not a
prohibition that could be ignored so long as the State legislated in an
evenhanded manner.”59 Taking all of this historical evidence into consideration, the McDonald Court held that “the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.”60
In dicta, the Court again offered reassurances. Even though the
Second Amendment is fully binding on the States and “limits their ability
to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values,”
their ability to experiment with reasonable gun regulations has not been
eliminated and will continue under the Second Amendment.61 Additionally, the Court recognized that neither its holding in Heller nor its holding in McDonald should “cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory
measures as . . . forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places
such as schools and government buildings.”62
Finally, the Court once again did not explicitly state what standard
of review lower courts should use when state and local gun regulations
are inevitably challenged. The McDonald decision essentially states that
the Second Amendment is fundamental enough to be incorporated
against the States. Even though the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the liberty interest to keep and bear arms for selfdefense in one’s home, that does not necessarily mean the interest protected is a fundamental right warranting strict scrutiny. And the analysis
for constitutionality depends on whether McDonald incorporated only a

how the holding may affect regulating guns on college campuses regardless of whether the opinion
was flawed.
57. Id. at 3036–38.
58. Id. at 3040–41.
59. Id. at 3043–44.
60. Id. at 3050.
61. Id. at 3046.
62. Id. at 3047.
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liberty interest or a fundamental right, the latter of which would warrant
heightened scrutiny.63
Because most of the Bill of Rights that have been incorporated
against the states are considered fundamental rights,64 local governments
would be well-advised to assume that the highest level of review would
apply and consider whether their current or proposed regulations would
survive strict scrutiny. In particular, public colleges and universities will
need to evaluate how the incorporation of the Second Amendment affects
their authority to enforce gun-free zones on campus.
III. PUBLIC COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES’ AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE GUNS ON THEIR CAMPUSES
In this Part, I will explain the relationship between state legislatures
and public colleges in reference to rulemaking authority. Then I will
briefly discuss recent lobbying efforts that either support or oppose the
carrying of firearms by concealed-carry permit holders on college campuses. I will also summarize the current trends of regulating guns on
campuses—most colleges and universities have enacted total prohibitions. And finally, I will argue that state statutes allowing concealed
weapons on campus threaten the ability of colleges and universities to
make important policy decisions about the learning environment of their
institutions.
A. A College’s Authority to Promulgate Rules
Pursuant to statutory enactments by state legislatures, public colleges and universities have the authority to promulgate rules and regulations concerning the conduct of their students, faculty, staff, and visitors.65 The overwhelming majority of college boards support total bans
on guns and wish to maintain institutional autonomy to implement policies beneficial to the learning environment in higher education.66 And
63. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (holding that assisted suicide is not a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, and therefore, rational basis review applies).
64. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that the freedom of
speech and the freedom of the press under the First Amendment are fundamental rights).
65. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 53B-3-103 (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.50.140(7)
(2010).
66. See Langhauser, supra note 12, at 96; see also THOMAS L. HARNISCH, AM. ASS’N OF
STATE COLLEGES & UNIVS., CONCEALED WEAPONS ON STATE COLLEGE CAMPUSES: IN PURSUIT
OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY 1 (2008), http://www.aascu.org/media/pm/pdf/
pmdec08.pdf. For example, University of Arizona President Robert Shelton explained his stance on
S.B. 1467, a bill that if passed would allow the concealed carry of weapons on Arizona college campuses:
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with the exception of Utah, public colleges in every state have the statutory authority to prohibit or restrict firearms on their campuses.67 Twenty-six states have either a statute or regulation that explicitly prohibits the
possession of guns in colleges and universities.68 Currently, there are
twenty-five two- and four-year public colleges that allow concealed
weapons to be carried on at least some portions of campus.69 All twentyfive of these schools are located in Colorado, Michigan, Utah, and Virginia.70
The scope of these gun regulations varies. For example, in 2004,
Utah’s legislature passed a law that prohibited state and local entities
from enacting or enforcing any ordinance, regulation, rule, or policy that
in “any way inhibits or restricts the possession or use of firearms on either public or private property.”71 The university board felt so strongly
about its authority to regulate its colleges that it fought all the way up to
the state supreme court.72 However, the court did not reach the issue of
whether the university’s claim of academic freedom under the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution allowed it to exclude guns from
campus in order to protect the free exchange of ideas.73 Although that
issue was to be litigated in federal court, the university agreed to settle in

The danger posed by guns is real, and well-documented. Bringing guns into classrooms
simply increases the threat to those on campus. Universities provide a unique environment that is dependent on open and vigorous debate. Introducing guns into classrooms
would dramatically and negatively impact the ability to engage in the exchange of ideas.
Instead, we would see the intimidation inherent when guns are present—something that is
antithetical to the very idea of a university.
Becky Pallack, UA President Rejects the Idea of Gun-Toting Students, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Feb. 28,
2011, http://azstarnet.com/news/blogs/campus-correspondent/article_79fe66ac-4368-11e0-9309-001
cc4c002e0.html.
67. LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST GUN VIOLENCE, GUNS IN SCHOOLS 15 (2010), http://www.lcav.
org/content/Guns_in_Schools.pdf.
68. HARNISCH, supra note 66, at 2–3.
69. ARMED CAMPUSES, http://www.armedcampuses.org (last visited Aug. 22, 2011) (providing
the names of the twenty-five colleges and universities that allow concealed guns on campus).
70. Id.
71. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5a-102 (West 2008).
72. See Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff, 144 P.3d 1109 (Utah 2006). For many years, the University
of Utah had banned students, faculty, and staff from carrying firearms on its college campuses. Id. at
1111. After the state legislature passed a statute that prohibited the university from enforcing its
policy, the university sued for a declaration that the state constitution guaranteed it institutional
autonomy, which would allow it to continue its enforcement of the firearm prohibition. Id. at 1112.
But the court held that the state legislature had plenary authority to regulate public colleges and
universities, and because the state constitution did not have a provision that stated otherwise, the
university did not have the authority to disregard legislative enactments. Id. at 1119.
73. Id. at 1121.
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return for a statutory amendment that allowed students living in dorm
rooms to opt out of rooming with a student in possession of a firearm.74
Utah, however, represents an extreme reduction in institutional autonomy—no other state legislature has prohibited its public colleges and
universities from adopting gun-control policies on their campuses.75 And
while most colleges declare their campuses gun-free zones, a select few
have begun to relax the rules for concealed-carry permit holders. For example, Michigan State University allows permit holders to carry concealed weapons on campus, but possession of guns in university buildings, including residence halls, is still prohibited.76 In general, Blue
Ridge Community College prohibits firearms but allows permit holders
to carry guns on its campus.77
B. Lobbying the Legislature
Significant lobbying efforts to allow concealed weapons on college
campuses were underway long before the Supreme Court decided
McDonald. For example, shortly after the 2007 massacre at Virginia
Tech, during which an armed gunman killed thirty-two people before
killing himself,78 a college student from the University of North Texas
founded the nonprofit organization Students for Concealed Carry on
Campus (SCCC).79
One of the organization’s primary functions is to push state legislators and college administrators into allowing those individuals with a
state-issued concealed-carry permit to bring their weapons onto public
college campuses.80 SCCC has also begun litigating this issue in Colorado.81 In Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, Inc. v. Regents of the
University of Colorado, the organization challenged the university’s prohibition of guns on campus under the state constitution.82 While the court
74. David B. Kopel, Pretend “Gun-Free” Zones: A Deadly Legal Fiction, 42 CONN. L. REV.
515, 529 (2009). The first compromise university administrators proposed—a ban on concealed
firearms from sports arenas, faculty offices, residence halls, and classrooms—was rejected. Gwendolyn Bradley, Universities Permitted Only Dorm-Room Restrictions, ACADEME, Mar.-Apr. 2007,
available at http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/academe/2007/MA/NB/Gun.htm.
75. HARNISCH, supra note 66, at 2.
76. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.425o(h) (2009).
77. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308 (West 2011).
78. Ian Shapira & Tom Jackman, Gunman Kills 32 at Virginia Tech in Deadliest Shooting in
U.S. History, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wpdyn/content/article/2007/04/16/AR2007041600533.html.
79. STUDENTS FOR CONCEALED CARRY ON CAMPUS, http://www.concealedcampus.org (last
visited Aug. 22, 2011).
80. Id.
81. See Students for Concealed Carry on Campus v. Univ. of Colo., No. 09CA1230, 2010 WL
1492308 (Colo. App. Apr. 15, 2010).
82. Id. at *1.

2011]

The Second Amendment Goes to College

247

expressed no opinion on the merits of the case, the plaintiffs survived a
motion to dismiss on a single narrow issue: the inability to carry a firearm in a vehicle while traveling on or through a University of Colorado
campus may infringe on the plaintiffs’ right to bear arms in selfdefense.83 Even without a decision on the merits or under the U.S. Constitution, this case is instructive in that the court held that the claim for
relief was not broad enough to include the prohibition of carrying guns
on campus or in college buildings.84
In contrast to SCCC, surviving victims of the Virginia Tech tragedy, as well as the families of those who died, founded a nonprofit organization called Students for Gun Free Schools.85 The mission of this organization is to oppose the efforts to allow concealed firearms to be carried
on college campuses.86 Thus, for several years now, the issue of whether
gun-free zones on college campuses reflects the best policy for protecting
students, faculty, and staff has been percolating. The question now is
how McDonald v. Chicago affects the debate.
C. Current State Statutes
Prior to McDonald, the greatest threat to a public college’s authority to regulate firearms on its campus stemmed from the passage of a state
statute superseding a college regulation; only three states, however, have
enacted statutes that either explicitly permit guns on college property or
explicitly prohibit colleges from promulgating certain types of regulations.87 For example, in Minnesota and Oklahoma, public colleges and
universities may not prohibit the lawful carrying of firearms in parking
lots.88 Oklahoma also allows a college or university president to consent
to “campus-carry” in individual circumstances.89 As described previously, Utah has the most lenient policy, allowing anyone to carry a firearm
anywhere.90

83. Id. at *11.
84. The university appealed the decision to the Colorado State Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari on October 18, 2010. Univ. of Colo. v. Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, No.
10SC344, 2010 WL 4159242, at *1 (Colo. Oct. 18, 2010). The issues up on appeal are (1) whether
the General Assembly intended to divest the Board of Regents’ authority to enact safety and welfare
regulations, and (2) whether the standard of review for a constitutional challenge requires a less
deferential standard than rational basis. Id.
85. STUDENTS FOR GUN FREE SCHOOLS, http://www.studentsforgunfreeschools.org (last visited
Aug. 22, 2011).
86. Id.
87. LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 67, at 15.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5a-102 (West 2008).
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By allowing concealed weapons on college campuses, these statutes
carve out an exception to gun-free zones that threatens the institution’s
academic freedom and the safety of students, faculty, and staff. Now that
the Supreme Court has incorporated the Second Amendment against the
states, legislatures may be persuaded to amend existing gun regulations,
including total prohibitions of firearms on campuses.
IV. MOVING TOWARD A STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Part IV, I will argue that public colleges and universities should
fall within the Heller Safe Harbor exception, which presumes constitutional any laws that prohibit carrying firearms in “sensitive places.”91 But
even if a college campus does not fall within this exception, regulations
banning guns on campus should still survive judicial review. In this Part,
I will argue that intermediate scrutiny should be the standard of review
courts use to determine whether a state or local regulation impermissibly
infringes on the Second Amendment. Finally, I will analyze whether
prohibitions of guns on campus and in residence halls can pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny.
A. Heller’s Safe Harbor
Before addressing the standards of review, this Comment seeks to
determine whether a college or university fits into the exception enumerated in Heller, which presumes constitutional “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings.”92 Although the broad definition of “school” technically includes institutions of higher education, Black’s Law Dictionary has defined the term as “[a]n institution of learning and education, esp. for
children. When used in a statute or other contract, ‘school’ usually does
not include universities, business colleges, or other institutions of higher
education unless the intent to include such institutions is clearly indicated.”93 Additionally, the term has generally been defined in statutes
and state constitutions as referring only to common schools, grades K–
12.94 Consequently, it would be difficult to argue that the Supreme Court
implicitly included colleges and universities within its definition of
“schools.”
The stronger argument is that public college and university campuses are within the definition of a “sensitive place,” and therefore, gunfree zones are presumptively constitutional. Although decided before
91. See discussion supra Part II.A.
92. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
93. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
94. Id.
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McDonald, in Nordyke v. King (Nordyke IV), the Ninth Circuit held that
the Second Amendment was incorporated against the states,95 and then it
went on analyze whether a city ordinance that made “it a misdemeanor to
bring onto or to possess a firearm or ammunition on County property”
violated that right.96 Avoiding the issue of what standard of review to
apply, the court held that prohibiting firearms on the county fairgrounds
was constitutional because the “open, public spaces the County’s Ordinance covers fit comfortably within the same category as schools and
government buildings and that prohibiting firearm possession on municipal property fits within the exception from the Second Amendment for
‘sensitive places’ that Heller recognized.”97
Opponents of gun-free zones have often argued that such a regulation is virtually impossible to enforce because of the open, sprawling
nature of college campuses.98 But when following the reasoning in Nordyke IV, this fact suggests that a college campus would fit within the definition of a “sensitive place” because of its open nature, and therefore,
any laws prohibiting the carrying of firearms on campus would be presumptively constitutional.
More recently, but for a different reason, the Virginia Supreme
Court held that a public college or university meets the definition of
“sensitive place” as expressed in Heller.99 Because George Mason University is a school owned by the government, it necessarily falls within
the definition.100 The court also noted that a significant number of incoming freshman are under the age of eighteen, that thousands of children
attend summer camp on campus, and that the university hosts various
family activities including high school graduations, athletic games, and
concerts.101 For these reasons, the university had a compelling interest in
95. See Nordyke v. King (Nordyke IV), 563 F.3d 439, 458 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 611 F.3d
1015 (9th Cir. 2010) (Opinion vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of
McDonald.).
96. Id. at 458. Plaintiffs in this case were gun-show promoters who sued because the statute
effectively prohibited them from holding gun shows on the county fairgrounds. Id. In the new opinion issued in May 2011, the Ninth Circuit deviated from this reasoning and instead adopted a “substantial burden” test to determine the standard of review for regulations of firearms. Nordyke v. King
(Nordyke V), No. 07-15763, 2011 WL 1632063 (9th Cir. May 2, 2011). See infra notes 119–22 and
accompanying text.
97. Nordyke IV, 563 F.3d at 460.
98. The open nature of college campuses and the difficulty in enforcing gun-free zones is often
used as an example of how the regulation is not narrowly tailored in the least restrictive manner
possible and thus would not survive strict scrutiny. See Lindsey Craven, Note, Where do we go from
Here? Handgun Regulation in a Post-Heller World, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 831, 852 (2010).
Strict scrutiny is discussed infra in Part III.C.
99. See DiGiacinto v. George Mason Univ., 704 S.E.2d 365, 370 (Va. 2011).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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regulating firearms to ensure public safety.102 Moreover, the university
narrowly tailored its regulation because it did not completely ban weapons on campus but instead prohibited them from being carried inside all
university buildings and at university events where individuals are most
vulnerable.103 But even if a court finds that a public college or university
campus does not fit within the Heller Safe Harbor exception, gun-free
zones, including total bans, should still withstand judicial review.
B. Intermediate Scrutiny is the Appropriate Standard
Challenges to state and local gun regulations should be reviewed
under intermediate scrutiny for three reasons: (1) the Second Amendment protects only a liberty interest, not a fundamental right; (2) even if
it does protect a fundamental right, fundamental rights do not usually
trigger judicial review under strict scrutiny; and (3) most judicial decisions thus far have refused to apply strict scrutiny, giving great deference
to the states’ authority and local expertise.
In order for a right to be incorporated under the Due Process
Clause, it must be “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty.”104
One could argue that the Second Amendment protects only a liberty interest to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home, and therefore,
the government has more leeway in the regulation of that interest. In the
due process context, strict scrutiny—the highest standard of judicial review—is appropriate only if the right is deemed fundamental; anything
less than that would warrant a lesser standard of review.105
After incorporation, however, some scholars have assumed that the
Second Amendment is a fundamental right that would trigger strict scrutiny.106 But fundamental rights do not always trigger this level of re-

102. Id.
103. Id. It will be interesting to see how the courts continue to analyze the regulation of firearms in public places. On one hand, Nordyke IV states that the open nature of county fairgrounds
necessarily classifies the property as a sensitive place, and therefore, the county’s regulation was
presumptively lawful. Nordyke v. King (Nordyke IV), 563 F.3d 439, 460, vacated, 611 F.3d 1015
(9th Cir. 2010). On the other hand, in DiGiacinto, the court found that because individuals could still
possess or carry weapons on the open grounds of George Mason University, the regulation was
narrowly tailored and therefore survived strict scrutiny. DiGiacinto, 704 S.E.2d at 370.
104. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
105. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
106. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, Colloquy, McDonald v. Chicago:
Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 455
(2011); Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1465 (2009).
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view;107 some are reviewable under intermediate scrutiny or even under a
rational basis test.108 In fact, strict scrutiny is “actually applied quite rarely in fundamental rights cases.”109 Of the amendments in the Bill of
Rights that have been incorporated against the states, only two trigger
strict scrutiny: the First and the Fifth Amendments.110 Moreover, not
every provision of the Fifth Amendment is reviewed under the highest
standard—when reviewing alleged violations of the Takings Clause
courts use a deferential standard.111 In sum, it is a fallacy to assume that
simply because the Second Amendment is fundamental enough to be
incorporated against the states, strict scrutiny will necessarily follow.
Even claims under the First Amendment do not always trigger strict
scrutiny.112 For example, the freedom of speech doctrine distinguishes
between content-based and content-neutral regulations, and the latter are
reviewed under a standard more deferential than strict scrutiny.113 In the
case of gun-free zones, such a regulation is content-neutral because it
does not discriminate based on such considerations as race, gender, age,
or mental health. Rather, the regulation is nondiscriminatory and applies
to everyone on campus.
Furthermore, even protected free speech may be restricted by reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.114 For example, most colleges and universities regulate when, where, and how individuals may
exercise their freedom of speech and assembly on campus so as not to
disrupt the academic learning environment.115 Similarly, in the context of
107. Nordyke v. King (Nordyke V), No. 07-15763, 2011 WL 1632063, at *6 (9th Cir. May 2,
2011); see also Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 227, 227 (2006).
108. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876–77 (1992) (joint opinion)
(“The undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the
woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”); Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978) (using a rational basis-like standard to review a violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (holding that
content-neutral laws that regulate free speech are reviewed under a more deferential standard than
strict scrutiny).
109. Winkler, supra note 107, at 227.
110. Id. at 233.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 237.
113. Id.; see also Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Five Takes on McDonald v.
Chicago, 26 J.L. & POL. 273, 298 (2011).
114. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); see also Cameron
Desmond, From Cities to Schoolyards: The Implications of an Individual Right to Bear Arms on the
Constitutionality of Gun-Free Zones, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1043, 1065 (2008).
115. See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 580-022-0045(1)(2) (1996) (stating that proscribed conduct
includes obstruction or disruption of the university’s teaching, research, administration, or other
public service function and obstruction or disruption that interferes with freedom of movement on
institutionally owned or controlled property); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. § 0240-02-03-.02(2)(c)(d)
(2009) (describing misconduct that is subject to disciplinary sanction as (1) disorderly conduct such
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the Second Amendment, when a statute prohibits guns on campuses, the
legislature (or university board) is simply regulating where the right may
be exercised.116 Accordingly, gun-free zones are analogous to the types
of time, manner, and place restrictions often imposed on conduct protected by the First Amendment.117 Because the holdings in Heller and
McDonald protect the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the
home, designating college campuses as gun-free zones would not be an
unconstitutional restriction.
Finally, several cases demonstrate that courts are reluctant to impose the highest level of judicial review on Second Amendment challenges even though the right has been incorporated against the states. For
example, one district court has held that the exclusions of the Heller Safe
Harbor are inconsistent with strict scrutiny, instead operating more like
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.118 Additionally, in
Nordyke v. King (Nordyke V), the Ninth Circuit adopted a substantial
burden framework similar to the standard used to review the constitutionality of abortion regulations.119 In this case, the court held that “only
regulations which substantially burden the right to keep and bear arms
trigger heightened scrutiny under the Second Amendment.”120 Because
the court did not reach the question of whether the challenged city ordinance was a substantial burden, the court did not define precisely what
type of heightened scrutiny would be proper.121 Most importantly, at least
in the context of this Comment, the court stated in dicta that “a regulation
is particularly unlikely to impose a substantial burden on a constitutional
as behavior that is “abusive, obscene, lewd, indecent, violent, excessively noisy, disorderly, or which
unreasonably disturbs other groups or individuals,” and (2) any intentional obstruction of or interference with institutional or school activities or facilities.); 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 90-10-60 (2010)
(entitled, “The right to appropriate use of university premises in the pursuit of educational goals,
occupational endeavors, and recreational activities”); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 478-136-030 (2005)
(“Freedom of expression is a highly valued and indispensable quality of university life. However,
university facilities may not be used in ways which obstruct or disrupt university operations, the
freedom of movement, or any other lawful activities. No activity may obstruct entrances, exits, staircases, doorways, hallways, or the safe and efficient flow of people and vehicles.”).
116. See Desmond, supra note 114, at 1065.
117. Id.
118. United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 605–06 (W.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 614
F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
119. Nordyke v. King (Nordyke V), No. 07-15763, 2011 WL 1632063, at *6 (9th Cir. May 2,
2011).
120. Id. The court found that the gun-show promoters’ Second Amended Complaint did not
allege sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss. But because much of the Supreme Court’s
Second Amendment jurisprudence was decided after the Complaint was filed, the court vacated the
district court’s denial of leave to amend with prejudice. Id. at *8. As a result, the Nordykes will have
the opportunity to show that the city ordinance prohibiting guns from county property substantially
burdens their Second Amendment rights.
121. Id. at *8 n.12.

2011]

The Second Amendment Goes to College

253

right where it simply declines to use government funds or property to
facilitate the exercise of that right.”122
Other courts have avoided the issue altogether. In United States v.
Skoien, for instance, the government conceded that at least intermediate
scrutiny was appropriate to challenge a law that prohibited persons convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor from possessing a firearm.123
In response, the court stated that “the concession is prudent, and we need
not get more deeply into the ‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire, for no one
doubts that the goal of [the statute], preventing armed mayhem, is an important governmental objective.”124
Gun regulations on campus, including total bans, would pass constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny. To survive this standard of
review, the government must demonstrate that the challenged regulation
is substantially related to furthering an important government interest.125
First, most people would not likely argue that a public college or university’s interest in ensuring public safety on its campus is not an important
government objective. Second, the prohibition of firearms—which are
deadly weapons—is substantially related to furthering the interest of
public safety on college campuses because, at the very least, the regulation would prevent injuries caused by accidental discharge. Although
intermediate scrutiny would be the appropriate standard of review to evaluate firearm regulations, if the courts do begin applying strict scrutiny,
gun-free zones on college campuses should still be found constitutional.
C. Gun-Free Zones Should Survive Strict Scrutiny
When reviewed under strict scrutiny, the “fit” between the government interest and the challenged regulation must be much closer than
required under a lower standard. Under this test, the government bears
the burden of showing that (a) it possesses a compelling interest; (b) it
narrowly tailored the regulation to achieve its interest; and (c) no lesser
restrictive alternative adequately addresses the challenged regulation.126
First, this section will analyze under strict scrutiny the constitutionality
of a complete prohibition of guns on campus. I will argue that both public safety and academic freedom are compelling government interests,
which gun-free zones are narrowly tailored to achieve. Second, this section will also analyze the constitutionality of regulations that ban guns

122. Id. at *8.
123. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
124. Id. at 642.
125. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
126. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S 442, 451–52 (2008).
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from residence halls, ultimately concluding that such regulations would
also survive strict scrutiny.
1. Total Prohibition of Guns on Entire Campuses
As discussed previously, the Second Amendment has been interpreted as a right to keep and bear arms in self-defense of hearth and
home.127 Therefore, prohibiting guns from college campuses does not
infringe upon this right. But even if the holdings of Heller and McDonald are extended to self-defense in public places, a regulation prohibiting guns on campuses, and even in residence halls, should survive strict
scrutiny.
a. Compelling Government Interest
The compelling government interest prong of the strict scrutiny test
will not likely be disputed. Educational institutions have a clear and
compelling interest to promote the safety and welfare of their students,
faculty, staff, and visitors while they are on campus.128 Gun prohibitions
on campus seek to protect individuals from gun-related accidents, suicides, and crime.129 Furthermore, colleges and universities are unique
public places because they have the additional interest in ensuring academic freedom and a free exchange of ideas in the classroom. Accordingly, firearm prohibitions also seek to prevent coercion or intimidation
by the display of guns, which may have an even broader effect on students’ ability to learn.130 Thus, the question becomes whether gun-free
campuses are narrowly tailored and whether there is a less restrictive
manner in which a college can achieve its interest.
b. Narrowly Tailored Regulation, Least Restrictive Alternative
Opponents of gun-free zones on college campuses often argue that
a total prohibition of firearms is unconstitutionally broad for the following reasons: (1) empirical data does not prove that more gun control lessens crime; (2) gun-free zones disarm law-abiding citizens and infringe
on their right to keep and bear arms in self-defense; and (3) concealed127. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); see discussion supra Part II.A.
128. See Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691, 699 (9th Cir. 2008). See also Craven, supra note 98,
at 851 (arguing that the fit between the compelling interest in public safety and a gun-free zone
would not satisfy strict scrutiny).
129. See HARNISCH, supra note 66, at 5.
130. See David Hemenway & Deborah Azrael, The Relative Frequency of Offensive and Defensive Gun Use: Results of a National Survey, 15 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 257, 272 (2000) (finding
that firearms are used more frequently to threaten and intimidate than for self-defense); NAT’L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2004 38, http://nces.ed.gov/
pubs2005/2005002.pdf (providing statistics for K–12 only).
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carry permit holders should not have to disarm before entering a public
college campus.
First, whether regulations will survive strict scrutiny does depend,
in part, on providing empirical evidence that more guns will likely lead
to more crime and that prohibiting guns will likely lessen crime.131 Opponents dispute much of the data about the causal relationship between
firearm laws and the rate of gun crime. For example, the gun lobby frequently argues that guns are used in self-defense 2.5 million times a year
and are used five times as often to defend than to perpetrate crimes.132
But a Harvard study recently found that this claim is based on flawed
methodology.133 What does not seem to be in dispute, however, is the
fact that 93% of victimizations of college students take place offcampus.134 In spite of the sensational stories such as the tragic Virginia
Tech massacre, statistically, a college campus is one of the safest places
you can be. For example, in 2002, less than 2% of students reported
threats involving a gun at school.135 In 2009, of the 13,636 homicides
reported, (71.8% of which involved firearms),136 only eight occurred on a
public college or university campus.137

131. Solid empirical evidence that prohibiting guns reduces crime would help satisfy the necessary prong of the strict scrutiny test.
132. LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST GUN VIOLENCE, THE 2010 REPORT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GUN LAWS 19 (2010), http://lcav.org/publications-briefs/reports_
analyses/2010_report.pdf; see also Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The
Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense With a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150 (1995).
133. Comparing the Incidence of Self-Defense Gun Use and Criminal Gun Use, BULLETINS
(Harvard Injury Control Research Ctr., Spring 2009), http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/research/hicrc/
files/Bullet-ins_Spring_2009.pdf. The report states that the often-cited number of 2.5 million uses of
self-defense could occur only from comparing two “radically different” survey methodologies. Id. at
2. When the compared data comes from the same survey methodology, the “overwhelming conclusion” is that guns are used far more in crime than self-defense. Id. A further problem with the methodology included reliance on self-reporting where it is impossible to know if the survey respondent
was the victim or the initial aggressor. Id.; see also DENNIS A. HENIGAN, LETHAL LOGIC:
EXPLODING THE MYTHS THAT PARALYZE AMERICAN GUN POLICY 116–21 (2009); David Hemenway, The Myth of Millions of Annual Self-Defense Gun Uses: A Case Study of Survey Overestimates
of Rare Events, 10 CHANCE 6, 6–7 (1997), http://www.isds.duke.edu/~dalene/chance/chanceweb/
103.myth0.pdf.
134. KATRINA BAUM & PATSY KLAUS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE STUDENTS, 1995–2002 (2005), http://bjs.
ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vvcs02.pdf; see also Kopel, supra note 74, at 547.
135. Matthew Miller et al., Guns and Gun Threats at College, 51 J. AM. C. HEALTH 57, 63
(2002), available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/cas/Documents/Gunthreats2/gunspdf.pdf.
136. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES (2009), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/offenses/expanded_information/homicide.html
(justifiable homicides, i.e., incidents of self-defense, are not included in these figures).
137. Id., available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/offenses/index.html (Click on Universities and Colleges link.).
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Second, although some campus-carry proponents argue that gunfree zones only “serve to disarm law-abiding citizens who might otherwise be able to protect themselves,”138 the need to carry guns for selfdefense on a college campus is extremely limited.139 Therefore, prohibiting guns on campuses is a much more narrowly tailored regulation than
banning handguns in an entire city as was the case in both Heller and
McDonald. The empirical data shows that a college’s interest in maintaining the collective security of its campus by prohibiting guns outweighs any individual right of self-defense on its premises.
Third, some proponents for concealed carry on campus argue that a
regulation prohibiting guns on college campuses is overly broad because
it prevents citizens who may lawfully carry a firearm in other public
places from doing so on a public college campus.140 Most states, however, will not issue permits to individuals under twenty-one years of age,
and therefore, most students would not be able to carry a concealed weapon anyway.141 Accordingly, the regulation is narrowly tailored because
it will not affect the majority of individuals on campus who are already
prohibited from lawfully carrying a concealed weapon.142

138. STUDENTS FOR CONCEALED CARRY ON CAMPUS, supra note 79.
139. See BAUM & KLAUS, supra note 134.
140. STUDENTS FOR CONCEALED CARRY ON CAMPUS, supra note 79.
141. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-309 (West 2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3112
(2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-203 (2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06 (West 2008); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 400.00 (McKinney 2005); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.172 (Vernon 2009). But see
Amended Complaint, D’Cruz v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, No. 5:10-cv00140-C, 2010 WL 4527004, (N.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2010) (claiming that the federal government’s
minimum age requirement of twenty-one to obtain a concealed weapons permit impermissibly infringes on plaintiff’s Second Amendment rights); Complaint, D’Cruz v. Tex. Dep’t of Safety, No.
10-141, 2010 WL 3693168, (N.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2010) (claiming that the state’s minimum age requirement of twenty-one to obtain a concealed weapons permit impermissibly infringes on plaintiff’s
Second Amendment rights).
142. Some state legislatures are seeking to permit faculty members to carry arms. See, e.g.,
S.B. 1467, 2011 Leg., 50th Sess. (Ariz. 2011); S.B. 354, 2011 Leg., 82(R) Sess. (Tex. 2011). But the
majority of professors, college administrators, and college police departments continue to oppose
allowing guns carried on campus by anyone other than law enforcement. See Langhauser, supra note
12, at 63 n.a1 (stating that the purpose of the article focuses on the reality faced by college and university counsel—many of their clients wish to restrict gun possession on their campuses);
HARNISCH, supra note 66, at 5 (stating that most college administrators and law enforcement personnel have “expressed serious reservations about allowing concealed weapons on campus”); LISA
A. SPRAGUE, INT’L ASS’N OF CAMPUS LAW ENFORCEMENT ADM’RS, INC., POSITION STATEMENT ON
CONCEALED CARRYING OF FIREARMS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 4 (2008) (stating the board of directors’ belief that campus-carry initiatives do not make campuses safer), http://www.iaclea.org/
visitors/PDFs/ConcealedWeaponsStatement_Aug2008.pdf.; Alia Beard Rau, Arizona Guns-onCampus Bill Advances, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 11, 2011 (stating that faculty organizations from all
three state universities oppose S.B. 1467), http://www.azcentral.com/news/election/azelections/
articles/2011/03/10/20110310arizona-guns-on-campus-bill-scaled-back.html; Jim Vertuno, Texas
Poised to Pass Bill Allowing Guns on Campus, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 20, 2011 (University of
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Additionally, because not all concealed-carry permit holders are
necessarily law-abiding citizens,143 allowing only permit holders to carry
guns on campus, while certainly less restrictive, is not a reasonable alternative because it would not likely achieve a college’s compelling interest
in public safety. Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment to analyze the different methods for issuing concealed-carry permits, most
states have “shall-issue” laws that require the official to issue the permit
if the applicant is at least twenty-one years of age, passes a fingerprintbased background check, and takes a one-hour safety class.144 Proponents
for campus-carry argue that these safeguards should prevent a college
from prohibiting permit holders from carrying on campus.145 But statistics show that not all permit holders are responsible, law-abiding citizens: from May 2007 to August 10, 2011, 359 private citizens and eleven
law enforcement officers have been killed by concealed-carry permit
holders.146 There have also been nineteen mass shootings and twentyseven murder-suicides perpetrated by concealed-carry permit holders.147
Notably, the Virginia Tech murderer was a lawful gun purchaser who
passed a federal background check in spite of being adjudicated mentally
incompetent two years prior to the incident.148 Accordingly, although
allowing concealed-carry permit holders to carry guns on campus would
be a narrower regulation than a total prohibition, it is not a reasonable
alternative that would achieve the public safety that a college has a compelling interest in ensuring.
Although proponents argue that concealed-carry permit holders
would be able to thwart tragedies like Virginia Tech if allowed to carry
Texas President William Powers stating his opposition to S.B. 354), http://www.salon.com/
news/feature/2011/02/21/texas_allow_guns_on_campus.
143. VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, http://www.vpc.org/index.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2011).
144. Kopel, supra note 74, at 519–20. A minority of states have “may-issue” laws that allow
the official to use some discretion in granting the permit even if the above criteria have been met. Id.
145. Id.
146. VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, supra note 143. A current snapshot is available at
http://www.vpc.org/ccwkillers.htm. For additional details, see http://www.vpc.org/fact_sht/ccwtotal
killed.pdf. This data is compiled through news sources and, based on its continuous updates, does
not consider whether any accused persons will ultimately be acquitted of these crimes. Additionally,
the reports indicate that at least one shooter has claimed the crime was committed in self-defense.
147. Id.
148. See Matthew Barakat, Rules Should Have Barred Weapon Purchase, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Apr. 20, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/20/AR2007042000
167.html; Michael Luo, U.S. Rules Made Killer Ineligible to Purchase Gun, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/21/us/21guns.html. Since the Virginia
Tech massacre, fewer than half of states are complying with federal law, which “requires them to
report to the national background-check system the names of individuals judged mentally incompetent or committed for mental-health treatment.” Brady McCombs & Tim Steller, Gun Rights vs. Gun
Control, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Feb. 20, 2011, at A1, available at http://azstarnet.com/news/local/art
icle_b8f1d999-1d81-549f-97ff-964cc5f5b6db.html.
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guns on campus,149 the actual likelihood of criminal deterrence is
small.150 In fact, possession of a gun seems to promote aggression rather
than deterrence.151 And with respect to mass shootings, “armed confrontation is not a deterrent; it is the point.”152 The notion that a concealedcarry permit holder would be able to deter a mentally disturbed individual is extremely unlikely. Even so, one scholar has argued that because
active shooters generally kill themselves when they know the police have
arrived, then it follows that “by far the best response to an active shooter
is for someone to start shooting back.”153 When discussing the mindset of
a mass shooter, however, the suicide likely occurs to avoid arrest as opposed to avoid armed confrontation. In most cases, death is the desired

149. See generally John R. Lott & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and the Right-toCarry Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1997); see also Kopel, supra note 74, at 543; STUDENTS
FOR CONCEALED CARRY ON CAMPUS, supra note 79.
150. See Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime”
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202–03 (2003) (finding that the statistical evidence that concealed-carry laws deter crime is “limited, sporadic, and extraordinarily fragile” and that stronger
evidence supports the conclusion that these laws increase crime rather than decrease it); Dan A.
Black & Daniel S. Nagin, Do Right-to-Carry Laws Deter Crime?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 218–19
(1998) (The authors answered the titular question in the negative and argued that the results published by Lott and Mustard, supra note 149, should not be used to formulate public policy. After
reanalyzing Lott’s data, the authors found that the conclusion that concealed-carry laws deter crime
was based on data highly sensitive to small changes in their model and sample.); Charles C. Branas
et al., Investigating the Link Between Gun Possession and Gun Assault, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
2034 (2009) (concluding that even though successful uses of guns in self-defense do occur, the probability of such success is low for civilian gun users in urban areas); McCombs & Steller, supra note
148, at A18 (Kristen Rand, Legislative Director for the Violence Policy Center, stated, “Gun-rights
groups’ vision of an armed society is fantasy . . . guns are not always used correctly, especially in
high-stress, chaotic situations such as mass shootings.”). For example, on January 8, 2011, an armed
gunman with a legally purchased semiautomatic weapon and high-capacity magazine attempted to
assassinate Representative Gabrielle Giffords in a grocery store parking lot. He shot nineteen people
and killed six. The attack took fifteen seconds. Id. at A1. Although Arizona has some of the most
lenient gun laws in the nation, no one with a concealed-carry permit was able to prevent the massacre or reduce its carnage. Id.
151. Branas et al., supra note 150, at 2036 (estimating that people with a gun were 4.5 times
more likely to be shot in an assault than those not possessing a gun).
152. Josh Horwitz, Guns No Deterrent to the Suicidal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008, http://top
ics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/16/guns-no-deterrent-to-the-suicidal/?scp=6&sq=&st=nyt.
153. Kopel, supra note 74, at 542. But the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators has argued that persons should not be allowed to carry concealed weapons on
college campuses, in part, because “there is a real concern that campus police officers responding to
a situation involving an active shooter may not be able to distinguish between the shooter and others
with firearms.” SPRAGUE, supra note 142, at 2. For example, at Fort Hood, one of the nation’s largest military bases, a shooter was able to kill thirteen people and wound thirty before any trained
military personnel were able to stop him with their own weapons. Kevin Whitelaw, Massacre Leaves
13 Dead at Fort Hood, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Nov. 6, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=120138496. Senior U.S. officials have not ruled out that “some of the causalities were
victims of ‘friendly fire,’ shot by authorities amid the mayhem and confusion at the scene.” Id.
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end, and whether it comes by suicide, the police, or an armed citizen is
beside the point.154
Finally, in the rare occurrences that criminal activity can be deterred,155 colleges and universities still have an interest in maintaining
safety on their campuses, which includes regulating conduct that is not
necessarily criminal.156 For example, binge drinking and drug use are
prevalent on college campuses;157 adding guns to that mix could have
dire consequences.158 Allowing guns on campus could result in more accidental deaths,159 would cause an increased risk of suicide for a demographic that is already at a greater risk than the rest of the population,160
and could increase the likelihood of gun theft.161 In addition, even if the
154. For example, the shooter in the Virginia Tech massacre committed suicide when he realized the police were closing in. Shapira & Jackman, supra note 78. He also left a suicide note in his
dorm room and sent a package of videos to NBC where he compared his death to that of Jesus Christ’s. Shooter: “You have blood on your hands,” CNN, Apr. 18, 2007, http://edition.cnn.com/
2007/US/04/18/vtech.nbc/index.html. Another mass shooter committed suicide after killing four of
his professors at the University of Arizona School of Nursing. Jaime Holguin, 4 Dead at University
of Arizona Shooting, CBS NEWS, Oct. 29, 2002, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/
10/29/national/main527308.shtml. Although the shooter at Fort Hood was shot by military soldiers,
communication with al-Qaeda about suicide bombings indicates that his own death was the desired
goal. Brian Ross & Rhonda Schwartz, Major Hasan’s E-mail: “I Can’t Wait to Join you” in Afterlife, ABC NEWS, Nov. 19, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/major-hasans-mail-wait-joinafterlife/
story?id=9130339.
155. Ayres & Donohue, supra note 150, at 1202–03 (stating that statistical evidence proves
that the likelihood of criminal deterrence is small). Cf. Kopel, supra note 74, at 544–45 (discussing
five anecdotal examples of citizens stopping a shooter on a college or secondary school campus, two
of whom were stopped by individuals not possessing firearms).
156. Because public colleges and universities incur liability for crimes and accidents that occur
on their campuses, they should maintain control over how to regulate the conduct of their students,
faculty, and staff. Courts have held that a college or university has a duty of reasonable care over
students, faculty, and visitors against acts that are reasonably foreseeable. See, e.g., Nero v. Kan.
State Univ., 861 P.2d 768, 780 (Kan. 1993) (holding that the university as a landlord owed a duty of
reasonable care to its student–tenants); Johnson v. Washington, 894 P.2d 1366, 1371 (Wash. 1995)
(stating that a criminal act by a third party is not an intervening act if it was reasonably foreseeable).
It would be inappropriate to allow colleges and universities to maintain the burden of liability while
at the same time restricting their authority to make institutional decisions about gun regulations.
157. OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, RESULTS FROM THE 2009 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE
AND HEALTH: VOLUME I. SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 24, 33 (2009) (finding that of full-time
college students aged eighteen to twenty, 43.5% are binge drinkers, 16% are heavy drinkers, and
22.7% use illicit drugs), http://oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k9NSDUH/2k9ResultsP.pdf.
158. Miller et al., supra note 135, at 63.
159. See David Hemenway et al., Unintentional Firearm Deaths: A Comparison of OtherInflicted and Self Inflicted Shootings, 42 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 1184 (2010).
160. LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 67, at 4–5 (stating that access to
firearms is a significant factor in the risk of suicide); CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
SUICIDE FACTS AT A GLANCE 2 (2010) (finding that among eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds, suicide was the third leading cause of death), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/Suicide_Data
Sheet-a.pdf.
161. Once stolen, a gun is much more likely to be used in a subsequent crime. BUREAU OF
ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, FOLLOWING THE GUN: ENFORCING FEDERAL LAWS AGAINST
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guns are never used or even loaded, they can still be used to intimidate,
to suppress academic discourse, and to create an environment that is not
conducive to academic debate. Therefore, allowing concealed-carry permit holders to carry guns on campus for the small likelihood of deterring
criminal activity, though more narrowly tailored than a complete ban,
would not achieve a college’s purpose in ensuring public safety. In fact,
it would likely prevent a college from achieving this interest at all.
c. Academic Freedom
Colleges and universities also have a compelling government interest in ensuring academic freedom and supporting the free exchange of
ideas between their students and faculty. Although the effect of guns on
campus with respect to this interest has not yet been subject to statistical
or sociological studies, there is evidence that the presence of guns may
intimidate students from expressing their ideas in the classroom.162 As
discussed in Part III, the Utah Supreme Court ruled in University of Utah
v. Shurtleff that the university could not ban guns from its campuses.163
More specifically, the court held that the university did not have such a
degree of institutional autonomy that it could act in contravention to legislative enactments.164 While the court found the college’s arguments for
institutional autonomy persuasive, it was constrained by Utah’s state
constitution and statutory law.165 The university’s claim of academic
freedom under the First Amendment was not decided, and the case never
proceeded in the federal courts. But the chief justice’s dissent in this case
is informative. She stated that “the record . . . contains extensive evidence that practitioners and experts in higher education are convinced
that a no weapons on campus policy is necessary to the educational enterprise.”166
Four years after Shurtleff was decided, there have been no reports
of mass shootings on Utah’s college campuses or in their residence halls.
Some students and professors, however, have continued to express intimidation resulting from the policy. A writer for the university newspaper
quoted a professor saying that he had seen at least four concealed weapons in his classroom, and it was “unnerving” when the guns were dis-

FIREARM TRAFFICKERS 20 (2000), http://www.bradycampaign.org/xshare/pdf/facts/2000-atf-follow
ing.pdf.
162. See Hemenway & Azrael, supra note 130, at 269.
163. Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff, 144 P.3d 1109, 1121–22 (Utah 2006).
164. Id. at 1117.
165. Id. at 1121.
166. Id. at 1128.
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played as the students put away class materials.167 Passing out poor
grades, especially when students often react in a heated manner, made
the professor feel particularly vulnerable to the weapons policy at the
University of Utah.168 Two students responded to the article, arguing that
the weapons were needed for self-defense and that more guns actually
reduce crime.169 But as noted previously, the claim that firearms are used
more frequently in self-defense than in criminal acts has been widely
discredited.170
Putting the interest of public safety aside, the question becomes
whether firearms on campus inhibit a college’s compelling interest in
ensuring academic freedom and the free exchange of ideas, and whether
a total prohibition is narrowly tailored to meet that objective. As of yet,
no college or university has filed such a claim in federal court. And although the Utah Supreme Court seemed sympathetic to such an argument, it was bound by its own state constitution.171
2. Total Prohibition of Guns in Residence Halls
While the holdings in Heller and McDonald explicitly protect the
right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home, college dormitories should not fall within the definition of “home.”172 First, residence
halls are not privately owned or rented residences. Rather, they are
communal living arrangements that often have shared bathrooms for an
entire floor, common kitchen areas, and other shared spaces not typically
found in private residences. Second, because the college, in this capacity,
acts as a proprietor, it has greater power to restrict and regulate certain
behavior on its property, including constitutionally protected rights.173
Assuming, however, that a dormitory does fall under the definition of

167. Rebecca Rasmussen, Concealed Weapons Threaten Campus Safety, DAILY UTAH
CHRON., Sept. 28, 2010, http://www.dailyutahchronicle.com/opinion/concealed-weapons-threatencampus-html.
168. Id.
169. Patrick Lee, Better Safe Than Sorry, DAILY UTAH CHRON., Sept. 29, 2010, http://www.
dailyutahchronicle.com/opinion/better-to-be-safe-than-sorry-1.2349076.
170. See supra Part IV.C.1.b.
171. Shurtleff, 144 P.3d at 1121–22.
172. The subject of residence halls actually came up during oral argument in the Heller litigation. Justice Stevens asked whether the Second Amendment would allow colleges to ban guns from
dormitories. Desmond, supra note 114, at 1072 n.263. The lawyer arguing against the D.C. ban of
handguns stated that such a ban would likely be constitutional. Id. Of course, such an explicit exception was not stated in either the Heller opinion or the McDonald opinion.
173. Scholars are asking this same question with respect to public housing. See generally Jamie
L. Wershbale, The Second Amendment Under a Government Landlord: Is There a Right to Keep and
Bear Legal Firearms in Public Housing?, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 995 (2010).
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“home,” a regulation prohibiting students from possessing guns would
still likely survive strict scrutiny.
Many of the same reasons for a total prohibition of guns on campuses carry over to residence halls. Once again, it would be hard to argue
that a college or university does not have a compelling interest in ensuring and maintaining public safety on its campus. College students, especially those living together in large groups, are an at-risk group who engage in particularly risky behaviors such as binge drinking and drug
use.174 They have higher suicide rates than the rest of the population,175
and 94% of suicide attempts with a firearm are successful.176 If a college
seeks to protect its students from the dangers of guns, which are exacerbated by alcohol and depression, the only way to achieve that interest is
by prohibiting guns.177
At least one scholar has argued that “[t]aking away the right to own
arms in the home purely because the individual chooses to pursue a higher education and live on campus is arbitrary and greatly overinclusive.”178 But this argument fails because there is no lesser restrictive
alternative that a college can implement to achieve its interest in preventing firearm-related crimes and accidents. Based on the statistical evidence presented above, colleges have made a reasonable determination
that allowing guns in dorm rooms would have potentially deadly results,
and the only way to achieve a safe and secure environment is to prohibit
guns. If a state legislature were to pass a statute defining a dorm room as
a “home,” that may be damaging to a college’s ability to ban guns from
residence halls.179 Until then, if a student wishes to keep a firearm, that
right may be executed off-campus.
Accordingly, a regulation prohibiting guns in residence halls would
likely be held constitutional under strict scrutiny because a total ban on
guns is necessary to achieve a college’s interest in protecting vulnerable
students from either intentional or accidental gun violence. Such a regu174. Miller et al., supra note 135, at 63.
175. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 160, at 2.
176. Matthew Miller et al., Household Firearm Ownership and Rates of Suicide Across the 50
United States, 62 J. TRAUMA 1029, 1029–35 (2007).
177. See, e.g., id. (“Household firearm ownership levels are strongly associated with higher
rates of suicide, consistent with the hypothesis that the availability of lethal means increases the rate
of completed suicide.”); Linda L. Dahlberg et al., Guns in the Home and Risk of Violent Death in the
Home: Findings from a National Study, 160 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 929, 932 (2004) (finding that a
gun in the home is closely associated with an increased risk of homicide and suicide); Douglas J.
Wiebe, Firearms in U.S. Homes as a Risk Factor for Unintentional Gunshot Fatality, 35 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 711, 715 (2003) (finding that adults living in homes with guns had a 3.7
times greater risk of dying from an unintentional gunshot injury).
178. Craven, supra note 98, at 853.
179. Langhauser, supra note 12, at 97.
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lation is also narrowly tailored because students are not required to live
on-campus.
V. CONCLUSION
Although McDonald v. Chicago has incorporated against the states
an individual right to keep and bear arms in self-defense of hearth and
home, public colleges and universities should be able to maintain their
authority to prohibit guns on their campuses and in their residence halls.
Colleges have a recognized duty in reasonably ensuring a safe environment for their students, faculty, staff, and visitors. Accordingly, highereducation institutions should be able to operate autonomously and promulgate reasonable regulations that will mitigate the harm caused by firearms.
Most importantly, the top priority of colleges and universities is to
provide an educational learning environment where academic freedom is
celebrated and the exchange of ideas may flow freely. In 1957, Justice
Frankfurter declared, “It is the business of a university to provide that
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment, and
creation.”180 Overwhelmingly, college and university administrators
agree that guns on campus would compromise the educational enterprise
necessary for the free exchange of ideas among students and faculty. The
concept of academic freedom, which has been enshrined within the First
Amendment, necessarily restricts state legislatures from interfering with
policy choices made by public colleges and universities.

180. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

